

AP Activity Plan 2025-26

Organization: Executive Committee
Resolution date: 07.03.2025
Agenda item: 4. Reports and plans

Resolution text

1 Activity Plan 2025-26

2 The activity plan is designed to cover the period from April 2025 to April 2026.

3

4 We will Empower progressive changemakers by:

5 Annual Work Plan: Keep your fist up and your head held high! Building resilience
6 of green youth organisation in Eastern Europe

7 The Work Plan (WP) aims to support green youth organisations in Eastern Europe
8 to build resilience for operating within environments characterised by
9 democratic backsliding and deterioration of democratic values, and maintain
10 capacity to advocate for improvement of democratic processes to counter these
11 trends.

12 The WP will incorporate two phases and will consist of an international
13 Resilience Building Summer Camp, followed by Local Actions (LAs).

14 • Summer Camp

15 The first phase, Resilience Building Summer Camp will take place in Chisinau,
16 Moldova, hosted by Gutta-Club on 7-13th July 2025. It will on one hand provide
17 the space for representatives of green youth organisations of EE to synthesise
18 and share their experiences of democratic backsliding, recognise patterns and
19 trends, and learn about where these trends come from and how to counter them,
20 and on the other, equip them with skills and knowledge on tools of resistance
21 and advocating for upholding of democratic values and processes. Moreover, it
22 will set the stage for the second phase of the WP and provide them with
23 opportunities to conceptualise dissemination activities and collective actions
24 in order to apply everything learned during this activity within their
25 organisations and local communities.

26 • Financial Support/Subgranting (Local Actions)

27 After the Summer Camp, there will be open call for participants and other
28 organisations for the Resilience Building Local Actions that will bring the
29 knowledge gained at summer camp on the local and regional levels. CDN will
30 support them to disseminate everything learned within their organisations and
31 wider communities, as well as to organise actions aimed at advocating for
32 upholding of democratic values and processes in their countries and regions of
33 origin.

34 Regional Meeting: Towards political autonomy of youth wings

35 This year Regional Meeting will be another time merged with Summer Camp. It will
36 focus on the specific topic being the leading part of our new project with Green
37 Forum, i. e. political autonomy of youth wings. We will focus on creating the
38 short definition of political autonomy common for all regions, as well as
39 exchange the good practices for one of the most important part of it, so
40 membership management and recruitment.

41 Study Session

42 The Study Session „Art and Cultural Cooperation of Green European Youth“ will be
43 conducted together with Federation of Young European Greens (FYEG) in European
44 Youth Centre Strassbourg, 29.09-5.10. It aims to raise awareness of green and
45 progressive European youth about the role art and culture has in shaping
46 political processes and empower 35 young people to use creativity and innovation
47 for activism, political participation, fight against discrimination, and
48 creation of sustainable and inclusive future of European societies.

49 The output of the study session will be toolkit on the topic of the event,
50 following good practices from previous years.

51 EYF Special Call for Ukraine

52 CDN will strive to apply for European Youth Foundation's Special Call for
53 Ukraine, either in the form of international activity, collaboration activity
54 with other organisations, or (cross)regional meeting. The specific topic and
55 desing will be decided by new EC, following the consultations with Member
56 Organisations.

57 We will Strengthen the Network by:

58 General Assembly

59 The General Assembly (GA) the highest decision-making body of our network that
60 will take place on 29-30th March, hosted by Zeleni prozor. The GA will elect the
61 new Executive Committee (EC), hear and adopt reports and plans, adopt
62 resolutions and amendments to the documents, approve/reject candidate members of
63 the Network and - most notably - discuss and adopt new Political Platform. The
64 General Assembly will include public conference with delegates and partners
65 introducing the topic of resilience building in our work.

66 2026 General Assembly will be an opportunity to take a deeper look at the
67 functioning of the network in the mid-term of the strategy. Hence, it will be
68 more internal event, gathering less people. As the network grows, the new
69 Executive Committee will need to find a way to organise next GAs in a
70 sustainable way (see: Financial plan). Tentative dates for 2026 General Assembly
71 are end of March/Early April. Call for host organisation will be published in
72 October 2025 and be selected by the end of November. The 2024-25 Executive
73 Committee recommends taking into account applications sent in 2024 also in the
74 next year, as there were outstanding applications.

75 Effective Internal Governance

76 In 2025-26, CDN will put more emphasis on its internal governance, strengthening
77 the work and position of EC and Office. This will be done by following:

78 Effective and Productive Executive Committee Meetings

79 We will continue increasing productivity and effectiveness of live EC Meetings.
80 During 2024-25 we will organise 3 EC Meetings (plus on GAs) instead of 4 as in
81 previous years. EC Meetings will be hence more focused, better prepared, with
82 agenda and important documents sent in advance. We will especially improve the
83 transfer period, so that newly elected EC can start their work immediately after
84 the GA.

85 Refined internal documents

86 In this year we will focus on strategical objective of further
87 professionalisation of CDN by improving internal management, governance, and
88 transfer of knowledge. One of the most important task for the 2025-26 Executive
89 Committee will be rewriting CDN Internal Rules of Procedure. The new document is
90 intended to better reflect the organisation's practice and be more
91 understandable to MOs. We will work also on the internal documents that needs
92 refining: Executive Committee guidelines; Office Transfer document or
93 Communication Strategy.

94 Diversifying Funding Sources

95 This year, CDN will put more focus on fundraising. We will put more emphasis on
96 the fundraising campaigns and new grant applications. Especially small-scale
97 fundraising will be prioritised to stabilise the finances of CDN and make it
98 more sustainable before applying for large-scale projects.

99 Enhanced Communication with Member Organisations

100 The Executive Committee regional responsables will continue good practice to
101 organise regional calls with MOs, in all the regions. In 2025, instead of study
102 visit, we will allocate funding for the visits to congresses or other events
103 organised by Member Organisation.

104 Internship programme

105 We will strive to open the first internship programme in 2025 or 2026 to help in
106 office work and further empower our activists and give them long-term
107 opportunities. The scope of the interns' work will be communications and
108 projects. The timeline and exact shape of the internship will be decided by the
109 new EC.

110 We will Bring Eastern European Perspective by:

111 Enhanced External Communication

112 In 2025, we will focus on enhance the CDN external communication, both in terms
113 of substantive content, as of methods and channels. This will allow us to reach
114 different target groups, both within the movement and beyond them. In terms of
115 substantive content, the new political platform will allow us to create more
116 posts on various topics, not only being reactive to recent developments or
117 adjusted to our activities' topics. Regarding methods,

118 We will also focus on digital activities by refreshing the format of
119 ElectionVision series, and create meaningful collaborations with other partners.

120 Networking with Green European Movement and Beyond

121 We will continue good practices on cooperation with other green organisations in
122 Europe from last year, especially regarding the contacts and common activities
123 with Federation of Young European Greens. We will also continue to attend the
124 events of European Green Party, Green European Foundation and other
125 organisations, try to build partnership with other Green foundations (as HBS
126 offices in the region) as well as increase our advocacy among them. We will also
127 strive to develop closer relations with our observer organisations and other
128 Green youth organisations in Europe.

129 We will continue networking and start new cooperations with other youth
130 organisations in Europe. Most notably, we will start cooperation with SAME
131 (Solidarity Action Day Movement in Europe) on the common project for 2026
132 "Solidarity Throughout Europe in combating Democratic Backsliding" that will
133 focus on advocacy, community engagement and building alliances as a way to
134 combat democratic backsliding in Europe. The project might engage other
135 international youth NGOs. We will also strive to become an observer in European
136 Youth Forum.

AR Activity Report 2024-25

Organization: Executive Committee
Resolution date: 07.03.2025
Agenda item: 4. Reports and plans

Resolution text

1 Activity Report 2024-25

2 The activity report covers the period from January 2024¹ to April 2025, is
3 presented and adopted by the General Assembly 2024.

4 We Empowered progressive changemakers by:

5 Annual Work Plan: Unite-Think-Act: Political Participation of Green Youth of
6 Eastern Europe

7 The Work Plan (WP) aim was to enhance political participation of young people of
8 Eastern Europe through strengthening the political vision and strategic
9 approaches of green youth organisations of the region, and to empower them to
10 engage in negotiations and diverse forms of social dialogue with different
11 stakeholders on local, regional and cross-regional levels.

12 The WP consisted of two phases and will consisted of an international Refocusi
13 Summer Camp that happened in Tbilisi, Georgia (5-10th August) as the first
14 phase, followed by Local Actions (LAs).

15 • Summer Camp

16 The first phase, Refocusing Summer Camp , will on one hand provide the space for
17 young people who are politically active in countries of EE to rethink key
18 aspects of their political contexts and share with each other their visions, and
19 on the other, offer them with skills and knowledge of different tools for
20 defining their vision, conducting political action, creating strategy for
21 achieving specific goals, and engaging in social dialogue with different
22 stakeholders. Moreover, it will set the stage for the second phase of the WP and
23 provide them with an overview of the analytical and action tools they can
24 utilise in order to better understand different contexts they are in and
25 subsequently choose the right methods for negotiations and political action.

26 • Financial Support/Subgrating (Local Actions)

27 Refocus Local Actions aimed to provide resources and space to young progressive
28 organisations in Eastern Europe to refocus their political vision by creating
29 strategies, policy documents or campaigns.

30 We facilitated and supported 7 Local Actions (Note: One of the local actions
31 took place in an authoritarian country and due to security risks, we are not
32 publishing its details nor results):

- 33 • Democratic Politics for Youth by Green Youth of Ukraine
- 34 • Mobilisation for Transformation by Young Greens of Georgia
- 35 • Sowing Season by Green Youth of Serbia
- 36 • Rising Voices - Shaping the Future Political Agenda by Protests (Latvia);
- 37 • Animal Liberation in Local Authorities by Turkish Young Greens;
- 38 • Green Youth Academy by Youth for a Green Future (Bulgaria)

39 Regional Meeting

40 In 2025, we incorporated the regional meeting into the Summer Camp. We dedicated
41 additional day for work in regional groups (South Caucasus, Balkan, Centre-East)
42 to facilitate intercultural dialogue and create sub-regional visions for the
43 collective Eastern European aim of upholding democracy and green values.

44 As an outcome of these sessions, we developed three separate strategic
45 approaches specific to the regions of Eastern Europe that would feed into our
46 Strategy 2024-2028.

47 Study Session

48 During the six days of the Study Session “Breaking the Barriers: Green Economics
49 and Youth Political Participation in Eastern Europe” that was held in the
50 European Youth Center in Budapest in November 2024, organised by the Cooperation
51 and Development Network Eastern Europe (CDN), in cooperation with Youth
52 Department of the Council of Europe, we discussed, exchanged experiences, and
53 generated knowledge about human rights, economy, and proposed ways of overcoming
54 economic barriers to political participation. The intersection of these topics
55 and the overarching theme of inequality were incorporated to discuss a variety
56 of issues. The study session fostered an exploration of the systems in which we
57 live - patriarchy, capitalism, and colonialism/imperialism - and the ways these
58 systems impact social and economic rights of people. Another key aspect was the
59 focus on intersectionality and the ways in which all these topics interact with
60 one another. The study session also aimed to show different perspectives and
61 alternatives to the most prevalent issues related to economy and political
62 participation, giving the participants the chance to discuss solutions and steps
63 towards a greener, more sustainable future. Finally, participants had a chance to
64 gain practical experience in using advocacy tools which they will be able to use
65 in their local, country, and regional contexts.

66 Tbilisi Security Conference

67 As part of “Green Visions on European Security” project, in collaboration with
68 Green European Foundation, we organised one-day conference in Tbilisi on 11th
69 August after the Summer Camp. During the event we spotlighted and dived deeper
70 into the work on the security and defence policy that CDN and GEF worked on
71 during 2023 and 2024. The discussed topics included: non-violence principle,

72 environmental and energy security, peacebuilding and defence policy (with
73 representative of Latvian Ministry of Defence). We also provided the space for
74 authors of articles created in the previous part of project to present their
75 findings. We gathered experts both from within our network, and beyond. We
76 followed-up the conference with the series of quotes from speakers on our social
77 media; the findings were also useful in creating Foreign Policy & Security
78 chapter for new political platform.

79 We Strengthened the Network by:

80 General Assembly

81 General Assembly (GA), took place in Vilnius, Lithuania on 27-28th April, hosted
82 by Belarusian Young Greens. GA - the highest decision-making body of CDN – was
83 the biggest one in CDN history and brought together over 60 people: the delegates
84 from Member organisations and other friends from the Green political movement to
85 share, network and debate. We elected Executive Committee, adopted activity and
86 financial plan for the next year, amended documents and adopted three resolution
87 concerning the internal governance of CDN. All the documents adopted are
88 available on the [website](#). In 2024, we also discussed and adopt new Strategy for
89 the upcoming four years, accepted new Member Organisation Mladi zeleni (Czech
90 Young Greens). All the adopted documents. During the Political Conference that
91 was a part of GA, we debated about importance of election in fighting the
92 authoritarianism with delegates from Georgia, Serbia, Poland and Latvia (to
93 underline the importance of EU elections). Thanks to cooperation with Green
94 Forum, we also hosted the special guests from Young Greens from Africa and
95 Americas.

96 Executive Committee Meetings

97 The Executive Committee met live five times during the reporting period: in
98 February and April 2024 for the 2023-24 mandate, as well as in May and July 2024
99 and February 2025 for the 2024-25 mandate. Thanks to introduction of the
100 delegation order, the EC Meetings were shorter and more productive, and there
101 was no need for additional meeting. We decided that the minutes from the live EC
102 Meetings that are published on the [website](#) should be more detailed and
103 transparent than previously.

104 Moreover, the regular bi-weekly meeting were happening on regular basis, 15
105 times during the 2024-25 EC mandate.

106 Regional Calls with MOs and Feedback

107 The regular online regional calls with Member Organisation happened only in the
108 Balkans region. It proven to be a success than should be continued next year in
109 other regions. Regular calls were not conducted in other regions due to
110 resignations or inactivity of EC responsible members, and lack of additional
111 capacity to replace them fully. Besides the calls, responsible EC persons
112 arranged in person meetings during regional meeting to discuss important
113 political and organisational developments.

114 In February 2025, the MO Survey was sent to Member Organisations to assess CDN
115 work and gather input for planning future activities.

116 Study Visit

117 The Study Visit were conducted to Croatia on 6-8th December 2024. The decision
118 on the study visit was made by Executive Committee following the political aims
119 that arose during the year: to facilitate cooperation between our MO Zeleni
120 prozor and Možemo! Youth Group and research on how potential cooperation between
121 two Member Organisations from the same country would look like in the future.

122 The study visit succeeded, as Možemo! Youth Group are applying for membership in
123 2025, with the explicit consent for that from Zeleni prozor.

124 Strengthening Internal Capacities

125 CDN started its strategic work on strengthening internal capacities to be able
126 to effectively deliver its work and achieve objectives. We developed Office
127 guidelines (adopted in February 2025) defining the working conditions of the
128 Office personnel, improved and reinforced delegation order and started
129 newsletter.

130 As every year, we organised Treasurer Meeting, where we introduced our Treasurer
131 (and back-up person) to finances of CDN. This year, thanks to better task
132 delegation order and using digital accounting tools, we were able to do it
133 online. We participated in external training of European Youth Foundation and
134 Council of Europe's Youth Department, thus deepening our cooperation, and
135 improving crucial skills and knowledge of the CDN EC and Office, most notably:
136 Study Visit „Enhancing international cooperation in times of war“ in Lviv,
137 European Youth Capital 2025 (October 2024), Consultative Meeting "How
138 Confident?... Artificial Intelligence, Young People and Youth Work" (January
139 2025) or "Training Course on Essentials of International Youth Activities
140 (February 2025).

141 We Brought Eastern European Perspective by:

142 New Political Platform Creation

143 At the 2024 GA, we decided to rewrite our political platform, so it an up-to-
144 date, comprehensive and detailed. CDN Team firstly consulted the structure of
145 platform during the Summer Camp, and then during open consultation meeting in
146 October. We opened the form for proposing postulates for platform in October
147 2024, where we received input from 3 MOs, and further consulted draft document
148 on Study Session. Unfortunately, due to resignation and inactivity of primarily
149 responsible for political platform EC member, ready draft document was published
150 for consultation only on 1st February, so about 2-3 weeks later than in first
151 timeline, thus the consultations were shorter than planned. Representatives of 3
152 Member Organisations took part in that part. The full document after
153 consultation was accepted by EC on 15th February, and will be voted during GA.

154 Digital Events

155 We managed to organise two ElectionVision webinars, on Taiwan (together with
156 Global Young Greens) and on European Parliament elections. We did not organise
157 ElectionVision on the elections that happened in the second half of 2024 because
158 of lot of events and lack of capacity of Office and EC in Q4/2024 and Q1/2025,
159 however we have it in plans to organise joint ElectionVision 2024-25 webinar in
160 new format.

161 Moreover, as mentioned previously we organised digital political platform
162 consultations.

163 Statements and communication

164 CDN actively monitored and responded to important political developments in
165 Eastern Europe by publishing statements and through social media. We published
166 12 statements and 3 opinion pieces throughout the reporting period, as well as
167 experimented with new formats (sanctions campaign, short reels with
168 representatives of MOs at the events or series of quotes from conference).

169 In March 2024, we updated our visual identity (logo, social media templates) to
170 to enable consistency in our communication and facilitate the creation of
171 content for EC and Office.

172 Since September 2024, we create newsletter to disseminate essential updates,
173 valuable insights, and informed perspectives on key political developments,
174 current events and ongoing issues in Eastern Europe. Besides, we ask Member
175 Organisation for their contribution, further fostering engagement in the
176 network.

177 Networking

178 We maintained and strengthened the cooperation with our sister-organisation
179 Federation of Young European Greens. We implemented our revised relation paper
180 in practice. Consequently, we took part in each other's GAs and other events,
181 published 4 collaboration posts, and had close communication both on the EC-EC
182 contact persons, and Office-Office line. Most importantly, We joined as minor
183 partner - represented by one of EC Member in the Prep-Team - in FYEG's activity
184 "Ready, set, go... The Green Future" in Baku, November 2024. We also cooperated
185 in organisation of European Train Tour in Belgrade (March 2024) and had joined
186 EC meeting during EGP congress in Lyon (February 2024).

187 Moreover, we sought involvement in activities hosted by EGP and Greens/EFA,
188 thereby further deepening our relations within the Green European community. We
189 participated in both EGP congresses in 2024. We also sent the e-mails to MEPs
190 from Greens/EFA to ask for (financial or substantive) support - unfortunately
191 with response only from Erik Marquardt's office. We continued networking and
192 cooperation with other Green organisations, by participating in events by Green
193 Youth of Montenegro, Green Thought Association (Turkey) or Global Young Greens
194 (meeting in North Macedonia).

195 We continued the great cooperation with Green Forum as our main partner.
196 Unfortunately, our previous agreement with ForumCIV was terminated and we needed
197 to move to another partnership programme. The transition was smooth and with
198 invaluable help from the Green Forum, unfortunately it took away a lot of
199 capacities from the Office in Q4 2024 and Q1 2025.

200 We started meaningful cooperation with the organisations beyond European Green
201 movement. Notably, we made agreements to deepen cooperation with SAME
202 (Solidarity Action Day Movement in Europe) and JEF-Europe (Young European
203 Federalists). We also established contact with IFJ (European Youth Forum) with
204 the intention to apply for observer or member statute after reaching necessary
205 number of members. We sent the three new grant applications for funders we did

206 not cooperate before, during the reporting period and got good feedback, however
207 did not succeed.

208 ¹ In the previous years, CDN had Activity Plans presented work from January-
209 December However, in 2024 we have decided to transition to a new approach in
210 order to enhance transparency, democracy, and allow for a better planning. Our
211 Activity Plans will now align with the timeline from one General Assembly to the
212 next.

F4 Preparation Rules of the General Assembly

Organization: Executive Committee
Resolution date: 18.03.2025
Agenda item: 1. Formalities

Resolution text

- 1 The rules of the preparation of the General Assembly has been fulfilled and all
- 2 deadlines met.
- 3 The only exception is the call for the Executive Committee and Member
- 4 Organisations, with the original deadline on February 27th, Thursday, which was
- 5 extended until February 28th, Friday - to fit with the end of working week and
- 6 month.

R1 Exception for the 2025-26 Executive Committee mandate to have more members above younger than 35 but older than 30 than envisioned in the statutes

Organization: Executive Committee

Resolution date: 14.03.2025

Agenda item: 5. Resolutions

Resolution text

1 With this resolution we request the General Assembly to create an exception for
2 the 2025-26 Executive Committee mandate, allowing for more members aged between
3 30 and 35 to be elected than currently stipulated in the Statutes. As stated in
4 the Statutes, the General Assembly retains the right to decide on exceptional
5 cases. Therefore, we propose the abolition of the limit for the 2025-26 term.
6 The resolution is only valid in case of statutes amendment S1 does not pass on
7 General Assembly.

Reason

In case of rejection of statutes amendments defining the change in age limit, we propose another exception allowing to create fully functional EC during this GA.

R2 Saving the democracy – right to protest in Eastern Europe, with emphasis on Serbia and Georgia

Organization: Executive Committee
Resolution date: 14.03.2025
Agenda item: 5. Resolutions

Resolution text

1 In the last couple of years we've been witnessing big backsliding of democratic
2 values in the world, but especially in Eastern Europe. While people have
3 responded with protests to various autocratic moves of their government, during
4 the last few months, two protests have especially captured the attention of
5 everyone striving for democracy around the world - the ones in Georgia and
6 Serbia. What is concerning, however, is how the protesters, especially young
7 ones, have been treated in both cases.

8 Protests in Serbia started again at the end of 2024 after the horrendous
9 collapse of the canopy on the railway station in Novi Sad, Serbia, killing
10 fifteen people (mostly young people and children) and severely injuring two
11 more. In December, following attacks at the peaceful commemorative gathering
12 targeted on students by the local regime officials, students decided to
13 barricade some faculties as a form of protest. Since then, most of the faculties
14 and universities around Serbia have been blocked by students at all times, with
15 no form of lectures. Secondary school students, and their professors, also
16 joined the ongoing blockades and have since stopped the work of most secondary
17 schools in the country, despite the government's efforts to crush their revolt
18 by threatening professors that their already low salaries would be cut off.
19 Simultaneously, students are also organising various protests and acts of civil
20 disobedience around the country. Students in Serbia have very concrete demands
21 from the government that call for responsibility and justice in the wake of the
22 Novi Sad tragedy: (1) Publication of all documentation regarding the
23 reconstruction of the Novi Sad Railway Station, (2) Confirmation of the identity
24 of individuals suspected of physically attacking students and professors, and
25 the initiation of criminal proceedings against them, (3) Rejection of criminal
26 charges against arrested and detained students during protests, as well as
27 suspension of ongoing criminal proceedings, (4) Higher education budget increase
28 by 20%¹. CDN fully supports students' postulates.

29 While people and institutions reacted with overwhelming support and joined the
30 student strikes, there has been severe harm of human rights from the government
31 and their supporters. As every day at 11:52 (a time when the canopy at the
32 railway station collapsed), students and citizens block rounds with 15 minutes
33 of silence for the victims, there have been quite a few cases of harassment,
34 including the cases of students suffering injuries due to being hit with a car
35 of a passer-by. Students have also reported being blackmailed, their private
36 information have been spread over the media, and some of them faced arrests and
37 prosecution. Serbian police and government even questioned some of the foreign
38 citizens under the allegations that they are involved in the student protests,
39 and this included an open attack and spread of personal information of one of
40 our friends from Croatia. On 25th of February, few NGOs have reported they have
41 been searched and questioned by the police. These are all terrible harms of

42 human and civil rights, with emphasis on the harm of young people and students.
43 All of the students' actions have been peaceful and it is evident that the
44 government's reaction is harming the right to protest.

45 Thankfully, students have continued fighting hard for justice despite all the
46 pressures. The protests are being organised around the country, and students are
47 mainly going by foot from city to city. Even with the national television
48 refusing to report on the happenings objectively, people have been reacting
49 positively and joining all of the student actions. With the upcoming events and
50 protest, tensions continue to rise, which is why more important than ever for
51 youth to have the right to express their dissatisfaction through the protests
52 without the threat of violence or arrest.

53 Since early 2024, Georgia has been gripped by a wave of mass protests. The
54 unrest began in April and May when tens of thousands took to the streets of
55 Tbilisi to oppose a controversial law resembling Russia's "foreign agent"
56 legislation. Seen as an attempt to stifle civil society, the bill sparked the
57 largest demonstrations in Georgia's recent history. However, instead of
58 responding to public concerns, the government doubled down, escalating
59 repression against activists and protesters.

60 Tensions reached a boiling point in October, when parliamentary elections were
61 marred by widespread allegations of fraud. The ruling Georgian Dream party
62 declared victory, but many saw the results as illegitimate. Outrage over the
63 rigged elections triggered another wave of protests, further fueled by the
64 government's announcement that EU accession talks would be postponed until 2028.
65 By November, demonstrations had grown even larger, met once again with harsh
66 crackdowns. Months later, the protests continue, as does the government's
67 campaign of repression.

68 Young activists now find themselves at the forefront of this struggle, facing an
69 increasingly hostile environment. Over the past few months, the government has
70 ramped up efforts to silence dissent through legal restrictions, digital
71 surveillance, and even physical attacks. Oppressive laws are introduced on a
72 daily basis. Protesters are met with brute force, while civil society
73 organizations operate under growing pressure from restrictive laws. Young people
74 from marginalized backgrounds are disproportionately targeted. Many have been
75 harassed, fined, arbitrarily detained, or physically assaulted.

76 The consequences are severe. Fear and exhaustion are driving many into self-
77 censorship, while others are burning out under the weight of constant
78 repression. Despite the dangers, however, the protests persist, a testament to
79 the resilience of those still fighting for Georgia's democratic future.

80 If the political situation in these countries was different, CDN would demands
81 better policies and police training to protect the rights of protesters. We are,
82 however, well aware that in the autocratic regimes and failing democracies,
83 policies are not enough. This is why we want for the protestors' demands to be
84 met and for these protests to be seen as a fight for democracy.

85 While we recognize existing support from the international community, CDN calls
86 for stronger media coverage and calls to action from the international
87 institutions that can protect the rights to protests in Eastern Europe,
88 especially Georgia and Serbia. Governments have seriously harmed both the local

89 youth and foreigners, and reactions like this are endangering democracy around
90 the whole region. We need to spread the word about the current situations and
91 show how young people are fighting for democracy for months, giving an amazing
92 example for all. Only with both internal and external pressures can people help
93 reach their goals. We recognize all the demands of the protests both in Serbia
94 and in Georgia as important stepping stones for reaching democratic regimes and
95 liberation of people of these countries.

96 --

97 ¹Instagram post by Student Blockades, 19th January 2025,
98 <https://www.instagram.com/p/DFAdx-loFdf/>

Reason

The reasoning is presented in the content of resolution.

Supporters

Young Greens of Georgia; Zelena Omladina Srbije

R3 Keeping green values in the age of AI

Organization: Executive Committee
Resolution date: 14.03.2025
Agenda item: 5. Resolutions

Resolution text

1 In the last couple of years we have been witnessing the transformation and
2 development of digital technologies. One of the dominant spheres that have been
3 on the rise is artificial intelligence (also known as AI, as it will be referred
4 to in this resolution). While AI has been present in the background for some
5 time, it is safe to say that it has finally become a crucial part of the
6 contemporary person's life, whether they are aware of it or not.

7 AI is now being used in a wide variety of jobs, from the essential ones like
8 healthcare and finance, to the creative ones, like writing and filmmaking. We
9 are using it every time we use Google translate, social media, automatic
10 passport control, smart air conditioning and, perhaps most evident, generative
11 chatbots such as ChatGPT, only to name a few. However, people don't often
12 realise how much AI is used in today's world in more controversial and harmful
13 fields, such as surveillance and warfare. With the rapid decline of democracy
14 and rise of authority and right-wing ideas, AI is one of the main tools of
15 oppression in Eastern Europe. It is proven that these tools are heavily used in
16 Serbia for spyware, as well as video surveillance that operates in a legal grey
17 zone^{[1][2]}, while similar happenings have been noted in Albania^[3], Bulgaria and
18 Hungary^[4], among others. Russia and Turkey have been using AI as a tool of
19 political authoritarian propaganda^[5]. Greece has been using AI technology as a
20 tool of oppression against migrants^[6]. Russia has additionally been misusing AI
21 technologies heavily during the full scale invasion of Ukraine since 2022, both
22 as means of propaganda^[7], and as active aggressive military threat^[8]. The harm
23 is even greater when we take into consideration that many of the Eastern
24 European countries don't even have any regulations regarding AI^{[9][10]}.

25 CDN is not and never has been against innovation and development in technology,
26 and we underline that the instances of questionable usages of AI don't mean that
27 the whole technology is to be ostracized. However, we must prioritise safe,
28 humane and democratic usage and development of the technology, both on a
29 personal and governmental level. This is why we demand and advocate for the
30 following ways that would help creating and using AI on par with green values:

- 31 • There should be complete transparency when developing AI and AI tools, as
32 well as transparency about when and how they are used. Development of AI
33 should be in public interest and with public accountability in mind. There
34 shouldn't be monopolisation of AI by the big tech, and there should be
35 open-source models that would ensure fair access. AI should serve human

36 needs, not corporate profits. Future developments should be open source
37 and all information gathering should be made public.

- 38 • AI should be used to help and improve workplaces and services, and not to
39 harm existing workers. We demand strong labor protection and banning job
40 displacement due to automation. AI should be primarily used and developed
41 in order to aid human needs, and to improve social services, such as
42 health-care, education, and social security. These tools should,
43 therefore, be free and accessible, with developed programs for education
44 of digital literacy that would help people use the tools.
- 45 • We demand that all the countries in Eastern Europe adopt detailed, dynamic
46 and democratic policies and strategies for AI usage that will prioritise
47 human rights and freedoms. The future usages of AI by the state must then
48 go in line with these legislations. These practices should be constantly
49 revised and updated in ways to ensure any discrimination by AI, especially
50 against the marginalized communities and migrants. AI in autonomous
51 weapons and warfare, as well as in mass surveillance should be completely
52 banned, especially by the government.

53 Finally, while we realise AI is the key part of contemporary life, especially
54 for youth, as an organisation with green values we must keep environmental
55 sustainability in mind. AI tools often use up a lot of energy and damage the
56 environment in the process, which is why we should strive against
57 overconsumption of AI and demand regulations of AI's energy consumption,
58 including data centers and large-scale models. AI should be developed as a
59 sustainable tool as much as possible, protecting the interest of the
60 environment.

61 In future, CDN plans to develop the strategies and resolutions regarding the AI
62 in accordance with other organisations such as EU, Council of Europe and
63 European Youth Forum. We will continue, as CDN representatives, to practice
64 transparent AI usage, but also encourage creativity, development and green
65 values.

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Reason

The reasoning for the resolution is presented in its content.